This paper studies the normative problem of redistribution between agents who can in ‡uence their survival probability through private health spending, but who di¤er in their attitude towards the risks involved in the lotteries of life to be chosen. For that purpose, a two-period model is developed, where agents'preferences on lotteries of life can be represented by a mean and variance utility function allowing, unlike the expected utility form, some sensitivity to what Allais (1953) calls the 'dispersion of psychological values'. It is shown that if agents ignore the impact of their health spending on the return of their savings, the decentralization of the …rst-best utilitarian optimum requires intergroup lump-sum transfers and group-speci…c taxes on health spending. Under asymmetric information, we …nd that subsidizing health expenditures may be optimal as a way to solve the incentive problem.
Introduction
Whereas human longevity depends on factors of various natures -genetic, environmental or sociocultural -, a large demographic literature also emphasizes the crucial in ‡uence of the individuals'lifestyles on their longevity. 1 Clearly, how long one lives is not independent from how one lives. Individual longevity depends on the extent to which one is willing to 'make an e¤ort'to improve or preserve his health, and di¤erences in the amount of e¤orts carried out by individuals tend to be re ‡ected by longevity di¤erentials. 2 What should a utilitarian government do in front of such a heterogeneity of lifestyles and longevities? The answer clearly depends on the source of the heterogeneity and on whether longevity is exogenous or not. However, it also depends crucially on the form of the individual's preferences. For instance, Bommier et al. (2007 a,b) show that if longevity depends on exogenous health endowments, it is optimal to redistribute from short-lived toward long-lived individuals only when individuals have additively separable preferences, while relaxing this latter assumption, agents should be compensated for their poor longevity. As they explain in their work, assuming additively separable preferences leads to an implicit assumption of net risk neutrality toward the length of life which leads to strong (and disputable) conclusions in terms of redistribution. 3 Starting from the works of Bommier et al. (2007 a,b) , we might, on the opposite, examine the redistributive consequences of another potential source of heterogeneity in preferences: the attitude of agents towards risk and, more precisely, towards risk on longevity. This source of heterogeneity is generally ignored since most economic models assume both expected utility and additive lifetime welfare which, as we already mentioned, presupposes that all agents exhibit risk-neutrality with respect to the length of life. 4 But it is not di¢ cult to see that the attitude towards risk plays a crucial role here, so that assuming a generalized net risk-neutrality with respect to longevity is a 1 See Vallin et al (2002) . 2 Health-improving e¤orts can take various forms: the e¤ort can be either temporal (e.g. physical activity, see Surault 1996 and Kaplan et al. 1987) , physical (e.g. abstinence of food, see Solomon and Manson, 1997) , or monetary (e.g. health services, see Poikolainen and Eskola, 1986) . 3 See Bommier (2005) on the notion of risk neutrality toward the length of life. 4 One of such models is Leroux (2007) .
A dilemma faced by a patient of age 50. 
Choice between two lotteries of life
Under net risk-neutrality with respect to the length of life, a patient would be totally indi¤erent between lotteries A and B, and would toss a coin to decide whether he will undergo the medical treatment or not. However, such an indi¤erence is highly unlikely, because the degree of risk about the length of life is a non-neutral information for decision-makers. Thus, it is likely that individuals di¤er largely regarding their attitude towards risk, and do not all exhibit risk-neutrality with respect to the length of life. Obviously, some patients, who are risk-averse with respect to the length of life, will choose no medical treatment (lottery A), while some others, who are risk-lover, will choose the medical treatment (lottery B). 9 As this example illustrates, the observed inequality in health-in ‡uencing e¤orts is likely to re ‡ect the heterogeneity of preferences, and, in particular, the heterogeneity of individual attitudes towards risk. But this raises the di¢ cult question of the optimal public policy in that context: what should a utilitarian government do in front of such a heterogeneity in the attitude towards risk?
The goal of this paper is to examine the optimal public policy in an economy where agents can in ‡uence their survival by exerting some monetary e¤ort, but di¤er in their attitude towards risk with respect to the length of life. For simplicity, we assume that individuals live for a maximum of two periods, the …rst one being certain while the second one is conditional on survival. Naturally, by choosing their health expenditures, agents choose a speci…c lottery of life, which re ‡ects their attitude toward risk.
So as to account for individuals' attitude toward risk on longevity, we model individual preferences using a 'mean and variance' utility function, and we assume that individuals have di¤erent sensitivities to the variance of lifetime welfare. 10 As this is well-known since Bommier's (2005) work, there exist two broad ways to depart from net risk-neutrality with respect to the length of life. One way is to relax additive lifetime welfare, as in Bommier's (2005) works; the alternative solution is to relax the expected utility hypothesis. The former approach has the advantage to keep on relying on the -convenient -expected utility theory, but su¤ers from a lack of intuition behind non-additive lifetime welfare. This is why, in this paper, we prefer to keep additive lifetime welfare but to relax the expected utility hypothesis. Thus, lifetime welfare is still assumed to be additive in temporal welfare (without pure time preferences), but the expected utility hypothesis is here replaced by a less restrictive postulate.
More precisely, it is assumed that agents's preferences on lotteries of life can be represented by a 'mean and variance' utility function of the kind defended by Allais (1953) in his seminal paper. Actually, Allais emphasized that, given that the dispersion of psychological values is 'the speci…c element of the psychology of risk' (Allais, 1953, p. 512) , it follows that '[...] even in a …rst approximation, one should take into account the second order moment of the distribution of psychological values' (1953, p. 513). 11 Moreover, it was also quite clear in Allais's mind that '[...] one cannot regard as irrational a psychological attitude in front of risk that takes the dispersion of psychological values into account.'(see Allais, 1953, p. 520 ). 12 We shall thus postulate a mean and variance utility function, which is a simple generalization of the EU form accounting for Allais's intuition. Naturally, other forms could be chosen instead (see Stigum and Wenstop, 1983; Schmidt, 2004) , but the mean and variance utility function has the advantage of 1 0 Actually, the 'mean and variance' utility form is a special case of what Machina (2007) calls the 'Moments of Utility'approach in non-EU theory, followed by Hagen (1979) and Munera and de Neufville (1983). 1 1 Original version: '[...] même dans une première approximation, on doit tenir compte du moment d'ordre deux de la distribution des valeurs psychologiques'. 1 2 Original version: '[...] on ne saurait considérer comme irrationnelle une attitude psychologique devant le risque qui tient compte de la dispersion des valeurs psychologiques.' simplicity. 13 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives the laissez-faire equilibrium. Section 3 studies the …rst-best social optimum and its decentralisation. The second-best problem is considered in Section 4. A numerical illustration is developed in Section 5. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
The model 2.1 Environment
Let us consider a population of individuals who live a …rst period of life (whose length is normalized to one) with certainty, but survive to the second period only with a probability . This probability depends positively on some monetary investment m:
equivalently, m can be regarded as a private health expenditure made by the agent in the …rst period of his life, so as to increase his survival probability. We assume here that agents have the same survival function (:) with 0 (:) 0 and 00 (:) 0. Note that life expectancy equals 1 + (m).
However, agents are assumed to di¤er in their preferences. In order to introduce these di¤erences in preferences, we assume that individual preferences can be represented by a function having the 'mean and variance'utility form (see Allais, 1953) , and that agents exhibit di¤erent degrees of sensitivity to the volatility of welfare: 14
where u i is the expected lifetime welfare of an agent with type i, while var(u i ) is the variance of his lifetime welfare. 15 The parameter i re ‡ects the sensitivity to the variance 1 3 Moreover, that functional form shall, unlike the expected utility function, allow some risk-aversion with respect to the length of life, even under additive lifetime welfare. 1 4 Note that this function, although more general than the usual expected utility function, could still be generalized by taking into account higher moments of the distribution of lifetime welfare across scenarios of lotteries of life. For more general functions, see Hagen (1979) and Machina (1983) . 1 5 Note that preferences represented by a function of that form do not necessarily satisfy the independence axiom, as the initial ordering between two lotteries may be inverted by a convex combination of those lotteries. 5 halshs-00586247, version 1 -15 Apr 2011 of lifetime welfare exhibited by a lottery of life. Under complete insensitivity, i equals 0 and we are back to standard expected utility (EU) theory. On the contrary, if i is positive, the agent prefers, ceteris paribus, lotteries with a lower variance of lifetime welfare across scenarios, while a negative i re ‡ects the tastes of 'variance-lover'agents. 16 For simplicity, we shall, in the rest of this paper, concentrate on two types of agents, who di¤er only in their degree of sensitivity to the variance of lifetime welfare:
Agents of type 1, with 1 > 0;
Agents of type 2, with 2 0 and 2 < 1 .
In other words, we shall focus here on two types of agents whose preferences on lotteries of life cannot be represented by a standard expected utility function, i.e. on two types of quasi expected utility maximizers. However, the extent to which those agents depart from EU theory varies across the types: type-1 agents depart more from EU theory than type-2 agents.
Under a zero utility from death and additive lifetime welfare (with no pure time preferences), the expected lifetime welfare u i is, for i 2 f1; 2g:
where c i and d i denote, respectively, …rst and second period consumptions of an individual with type i. The function u is increasing and strictly concave.
In this two-scenarios world, the variance of lifetime welfare takes a simple form:
The variance of lifetime welfare depends on second-period consumption and on the variance of lifetime, equal to (1 (m i )) (m i ). 17 Hence, we shall, for ease of notation, use the notation var(u i ) var (d i ; m i ) in the rest of this paper.
It should be stressed that second-period consumption tends, ceteris paribus, to increase the variance of lifetime welfare: the higher second-period consumption is, the higher the welfare gain of survival is, and the higher the welfare loss from death is too.
Second-period consumption is thus a major source of welfare volatility.
However, the probability of survival (m i ) has a non-monotonic relationship with the variance of lifetime welfare. Actually,
Hence, a higher survival probability raises the variance of lifetime welfare if (m i )
is smaller than 1/2, whereas it tends to lower it if (m i ) is larger than 1/2. Moreover,
, it follows that a higher health e¤ort tends to raise the variance of lifetime welfare if (m i ) is smaller than 1/2, whereas it lowers it if (m i ) is higher than 1/2.
Given that, in industrialized economies, the life expectancy is high and the variance of lifetime is low (as the survival curve is close to the rectangular), we shall, in the rest of this paper, concentrate on values of larger than 1/2 for any level of health e¤orts.
A natural corollary of this postulate is that, when an individual spends more on his health, he does not only increase his life expectancy, but reduces also the variance of his lifetime. 18 1 7 Note that the variance of lifetime has a minimum at = 0 and = 1, and reaches its maximum at = 1=2: 1 8 Note also that our focus on > 1=2 has another intuitive justi…cation. Actually, when > 1=2, individual welfare is increasing in life expectancy for any level of i , as one expects. To see this, note that imposing @U i @ 0 amounts to assume:
which, under i > 0, is true for all levels of di if and only if (mi) 1=2 for all levels of mi.
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The laissez-faire
Agents of type i 2 f1; 2g choose …rst period and second period consumptions, as well as health expenditure so as to maximize their objective function subject to their budget constraint:
where lifetime utility takes the following form
and var (d i ; m i ) is equal to (1) . We assume that savings are entirely invested in private annuities and that R i is the return of an annuity. The wealth endowment w is exogenous and identical for all agents. Note also that there is no pure time preference, and that the interest rate is zero.
Assuming actuarially fair prices (i.e. R i = 1= (m i )), the laissez-faire allocation for an agent of type i 2 f1; 2g satis…es the following conditions:
where var x (x; y) and var y (x; y) are partial derivatives of the variance of lifetime welfare with respect to x and y. Condition the end of the …rst period. Thus, concentrating consumption in the …rst period is a straightforward way to protect oneself against a too large variation of lifetime welfare across scenarios of the lottery of life. Note also that the higher i is, the steeper the intertemporal consumption pro…le will be ceteris paribus, because the more variancesensitive the agent is, the more he will use that trick to avoid big welfare losses. This result is presented in the proposition below:
Proposition 1 If the market of annuities is actuarially fair, c i > d i for any individual with type i > 0.
Condition (4) characterizes the level of health expenditure chosen by the individual in the equilibrium. Under traditional expected utility theory, this condition would collapse
, stating that the optimal health expenditure is such that the marginal welfare gain due to health expenditure (in terms of the second period of life)
should equalize the marginal welfare cost of such an e¤ort. However, under a positive i , the marginal lifetime utility from health expenditure depends also on its impact on the variance of lifetime welfare, which is always positive since we assume that (m i ) is higher than 1/2. Thus, under positive sensitivity to the variance in welfare, the level of health investment is always greater than under expected utility theory. Note also that in the laissez-faire, the individual does not take into account the impact of health expenditures on the return of his savings, R i = 1= (m i ) so that the individual chooses a level of health expenditures which is too high compared to its optimal level. 19 We can now study the equilibrium levels of consumptions and of health expenditure of individuals with di¤erent sensitivities to the variance in welfare. Our results are summarized in the following proposition: Proposition 2 Provided the market for annuities is actuarially fair, the laissez-faire allocation is such that 1 9 This result is highlighted in Becker and Philipson (1998) . Actually, each agent tends to consider that his own health e¤ort will not a¤ect the return of the annuity whereas at the aggregate level it does. This is also emphasized in Sheshinski (2007, chapter 7). may a priori vary in di¤erent ways. We will come back on the importance of functional forms in Section 5, where we present some numerical examples. This is why we shall here equalize …rst or second period consumptions between individuals so as to determine how the chosen variables (c i ; d i ; m i ) di¤er across agents.
If …rst-period consumption is equal for the two types of agents, then it is necessarily the case that an agent who has a larger sensitivity to the dispersion of psychological values chooses a lower second-period consumption and more health spending than an agent with a lower i . The intuition behind that result is the following. For a more sensitive agent, having a lower second-period consumption and spending more on health is a rational way to reduce the variance of lifetime welfare since the potential loss (i.e. second-period utility) would be smaller and this would happen with a lower probability.
Agents with a lower i do not have the same concerns, and thus choose, for an equal …rst period consumption, a higher second-period consumption and a lower health e¤ort.
If, alternatively, it is second-period consumption that is equal for both types of agents, then, without surprise, agents who are more sensitive to the variance will consume more in the …rst period in comparison to less-variance-sensitive agents, so that, given the budget constraint faced, they will also invest less in health in comparison with agents with a lower i . That result is not surprising, as consuming more in the …rst period is a standard way to insure oneself against a too large volatility of lifetime welfare.
Thus, one cannot say, under general functional forms, whether agents with a higher i will spend more or fewer resources in health. A higher sensitivity to the dispersion of psychological value may imply that an agent spends more on health (at the cost of second-period consumption) or on the contrary, spends less on health (to favour …rstperiod consumption). That indeterminacy can be explained as follows. The two ways 10 halshs-00586247, version 1 -15 Apr 2011 to protect oneself against a high volatility of lifetime welfare are either to spend a lot on health or to spend a lot in …rst-period consumption. Which solution dominates depends on the curvatures of u(c i ) and (m i ). If 0 (m i ) is large and u 0 (c i ) is low, then agents of type 1 will opt for the …rst way to avoid lifetime welfare variance; on the contrary, if 0 (m i ) is low and u 0 (c i ) is large, agents of type 1 will opt for the second as a more e¢ cient way to avoid lifetime welfare volatility.
3 The …rst-best problem 3 
.1 The social optimum
In this section, we assume that the social planner is utilitarian and that he perfectly observes individuals'types. 20 The social planner can lend or borrow at a zero interest rate in order to balance the budget at any given period. The resource constraint of the economy is thus:
where n i denotes the number of agents of type i 2 f1; 2g in the population. Thus, the social planner chooses consumption paths as well as health investments levels for each type of individuals in order to maximize X i=1;2
subject to (5) .
The …rst order conditions yield:
Combining (6) and (7), we obtain the optimal trade-o¤ between present and future consumptions; this is identical to our laissez-faire condition (3) when the price of the annuity is actuarially fair. Thus, …rst-period consumption is still preferred to future consumption in the …rst-best. On the contrary, (8) together with (6) di¤ers from (4) by a term 0 (m i ) d i . In the …rst-best, the social planner realizes that the level of health expenditure also modi…es the budget set. Indeed, a higher level of e¤ort m i not only increases direct utility through higher survival but also decreases consumption possibilities as (m i ) increases in (5) . Thus, in the …rst-best optimum, the social planner induces the individual to exert lower e¤ort so as to limit the negative impact of m i over the individual's budget set; this was not the case in the laissez-faire as the individual was taking the annuity return, R i as given. These …rst results are summarized in the following proposition:
The …rst-best allocation is such that, for agents of type i 2 f1; 2g:
where m F B i and m LF i are the level of health expenditures in the …rst-best and laissezfaire respectively. We now turn to the allocation of consumptions and of health expenditure according to individuals types. Obviously, …rst-period consumption is equalized across individuals. However, considering (7) and (8), there is no reason for secondperiod consumptions and health expenditure to be identical across individuals (since i enters into those equations). A priori, it is impossible to rank health expenditures and consumptions depending on individuals'types, unless some additional assumptions are made. Therefore, we assume two individuals with types 1 and 2 such that one is sensitive to the variance in lifetime welfare and the other is not and obtain the following results: 21 Proposition 4 Consider two types of individuals with sensitivity to the variance in welfare such that 1 > 0 and 2 = 0. The …rst-best yields: In the …rst-best, …rst period consumption is equalized across individuals while second period consumption and health expenditures are di¤erentiated between individuals.
The individual with a zero sensitivity to the variance obtains a higher level of secondperiod consumption than a variance-sensitive agent. This result is not surprising, as second-period consumption tends necessarily to raise lifetime welfare variance. 22 Given that lifetime welfare variance enters type 1's utility negatively, it does not come as a surprise that the social optimum implies d 1 < d 2 .
However, it is not clear whether health expenditures should be higher or lower for agents with higher sensitivity to the variance. This indeterminacy can be explained as follows. On the one hand, higher health investment reduces the lifetime welfare variance of variance-sensitive agents, which matters for those agents (unlike for agents of type 2), and, as such, is justi…ed on the grounds of social welfare maximization. On the other hand, dedicating more resources to the health of variance-sensitive agents has, given d 1 < d 2 , a smaller impact on the expected lifetime welfare of agents of type 1 than on the expected lifetime welfare of agents of type 2. Hence, whether m 1 exceeds m 2 or not depends on which e¤ect dominates, and, thus, on the level of and on the shapes of the utility function and the survival function. 23 As shown in the Appendix B, if 1 is extremely large, one necessarily has m 1 > m 2 , because the social welfare gain from dedicating more resources to the health of agents of type 1 is here large (given the extreme sensitivity of those agents to the variance of lifetime welfare) and thus largely compensates the social welfare loss due to the lower second-period utility exhibited by the life of agents of type 1. But, as we shall show in the numerical section, the condition 1 large is only su¢ cient (but not necessary) to have m 1 > m 2 . 2 2 Clearly, in the extreme case where second-period consumption equals 0, and u(0) = 0, there is a zero lifetime welfare variance despite the risk about the length of life. 2 3 For instance, if the utility function is strongly concave in consumption, we have, at the …rst-best, u(d1) u(d2), so that the second e¤ect is minor and dominated by the …rst one, leading to m1 > m2 at the social optimum. Similar examples can be used to show the sensitivity of the social optimum to the shape of the survival function (mi).
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Decentralisation
We now study how to decentralise the above optimum through a tax-and-transfer scheme.
In the following, we assume that instruments available for the social planner are a tax on savings, a tax on health expenditures and lump sum transfers. We still assume that the annuity market is actuarially fair so that R i = 1= (m i ) at equilibrium. The individual's problem is then to maximize:
where t i is the tax on savings, i the tax on health expenditures and T i is a monetary transfer for any individual with sensitivity i . Deriving …rst order conditions with respect to s i and m i and rearranging them, we obtain
Comparing these conditions with both (6), (7) and (8), we …nd that the optimal tax on savings is always zero for any type of individual, e.g. t i = 0 but the optimal level of the tax on health expenditures i should be equal to 0 (m i ) d i > 0. This can be related to Becker and Philipson (1998) ; by implementing a positive tax on health expenditures, one limits health expenditures and make it tend toward its …rst-best level. Note that this tax on health spending is type-speci…c, that is, it depends on the degree of variancesensitivity i .
To explore how the optimal tax on health spending i varies with i , let us turn back to the special case of Proposition 4, where 1 > 0 and 2 = 0. In that speci…c case, we have, under a large 1 ,
Otherwise, we have 1 7 2 if m 1 < m 2 . We also …nd that if m 1 < m 2 , the level of 
The second-best problem
Whereas the above optimal policy discussion assumed a perfect observability of agents' preferences on lotteries of life, such a perfect observability is hardly plausible. Actually, while a government would like agents to reveal their preferences (i.e. their i ), these may be tempted to lie on their type to bene…t from an allocation that better coincides with their preferences. Hence, we need to relax the assumption of perfect observability of types, and turn to the analysis of the second-best.
In order to simplify the analysis, we shall concentrate, in the rest of the paper, on the two types of agents of Proposition 4: variance-sensitive agents ( 1 > 0 ) and expected utility maximisers ( 2 = 0). A priori, the …rst-best may redistribute from agents of type 2 to agents of type 1, or, the contrary, from agents of type 1 to agents of type 2, depending on the functional form of the survival probability and the utility function. For instance, refering to Proposition 4, it is possible that m 1 < m 2 at the social optimum, so that it is likely that agents of type 1 will be tempted to pretend to be of type 2 (as c 1 = c 2 and d 1 < d 2 ). 24 However, if 1 is su¢ ciently large, implying m 1 > m 2 at the social optimum, it may be the case that variance-insensitive agents mimic variance-sensitive agents. Therefore, we need to consider here the two possible cases.
The problem faced by the social planner takes the following general form:
In the case where type-1 agents are tempted to copy type-2 agents, the …rst incentive compatibility constraint is binding, and the second one is not (see Subsection 4.1). On the contrary, in the case where type-2 agents are tempted to mimic type-1 agents, the second incentive compatibility constraint is binding, and the other is not (see Subsection 4.2). 25
Case 1: type 1 mimicking type 2
The Lagrangian of the problem has the following expression
where and are the Lagrange multipliers associated to, respectively, the resource constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint. Solving the Lagrangian and rearranging FOCs, we …nd, for the mimicker (type-1 individual), the usual result of no distortion at the top:
so that, comparing these equations with (9) and (10), second-best optimal taxes level are t 1 = 0
As in the …rst-best, savings are not taxed, while health spending are taxed in such a way as to correct for the Becker-Philipson e¤ect. We also …nd that the following trade-o¤s for type-2 agents
and taxes have now the following forms:
Thus, in the second-best, it is optimal to subsidize savings and to tax health expenditures for the type-2 agent. The rational behind t 2 < 0 is that in a second-best, it is optimal to encourage second-period consumption for the type-2 agent as a way to discourage a type-1 individual from mimicking a type-2 (by doing so, he would obtain too high a level of second period consumption). Regarding the tax on health spending, the incentive compatibility constraint tends to reinforce the internalisation of the Becker-Philipson e¤ect. This additional constraint prevents the individual 1 from mimicking individual 2 as individual 1 would not invest enough in health if he was pretending to be of type 2.
Our …ndings are summarized in the proposition below:
Proposition 5 Consider two types of individuals with sensitivity to the variance in welfare such that 1 > 0 and 2 = 0. Under asymmetric information,
The "no distortion at the top" result holds.
A subsidy on savings is optimal for type-2 individuals and is equal to
A tax on health expenditures for type-2 individuals is optimal and equal to 0 (m 2 ) d 2
Case 2: type 2 mimicking type 1
We now study the case where type-2 agents mimic type-1 agents. The Lagrangian of this problem has the following expression
Note that the incentive compatibility constraint has here a simple expected utility form,
Proceeding as before, we …nd the trade-o¤s between two period consumptions and between consumption and health spending for the mimicker (here individual 2):
The usual result of no distortion at the bottom holds; for the individual with 2 = 0, the trade-o¤s between two-period consumption and between consumption and health expenditures are equivalent to the …rst-best ones. Thus, the tax on savings is zero in this case (t 2 = 0) and health expenditures are taxed in the same way as in the …rst-best, i.e. 2 = 0 (m 2 ) d 2 .
Rearranging …rst order conditions, individual-1 trade-o¤s are now distorted:
Comparing them with (9) and (10) of the decentralized problem, we …nd that the secondbest optimum could be decentralized by implementing taxes on savings and on health expenditures equal to
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Let now study the level of these taxes. We …nd that type-1 agents should face a tax on savings. The intuition behind this result is related to the incentive constraint: since agents of type-2 always prefer higher levels of second-period consumption, it is optimal to tax savings of the type-1 agents in order to prevent the former from pretending to be the latter.
However, the sign of 1 is uncertain and might be positive or negative depending on the size of two countervailing e¤ects. On the one hand, 0 (m 1 ) d 1 > 0 corresponds to the Becker-Philipson e¤ect; as we already mentioned in the …rst-best, imposing a tax on health expenditures is a way to limit individuals'investment in health and thus its negative impact on their budget set. On the other hand, 1 var m (d 1 ; m 1 ) = n 1 < 0 and is related to the incentive e¤ect; in order to prevent mimicking behavior of type 2, the social planner would like to subsidize health expenditures of type 1. indeed, a type-2 agent mimicking a type-1 agent would obtain a too high level of health spending.
Note also that if individuals could perfectly see the impact of their health investment on their budget set, the Becker-Philipson e¤ect would be absent and in the second-best, subsidization of health expenditures would be optimal. Thus, the overall e¤ect on the sign of 1 is ambiguous and depends on the magnitude of both the Becker-Philipson and the incentive e¤ects.
Our …ndings are summarized in the proposition below: Proposition 6 Consider two types of individuals with sensitivity to the variance in welfare such that 1 > 0 and 2 = 0. Under asymmetric information,
The "no distortion at the bottom" result holds.
A tax on savings is optimal for type-1 individuals and is equal to 1 var d (d 1 ; m 1 ) = n 1 (m 1 ).
A positive or negative tax on health expenditures for type-1 individuals is optimal and equal to 0 (m 1 ) d 1 + 1 var m (d 1 ; m 1 ) = n 1 .
Let us now illustrate our results by some numerical simulations. For that purpose, we shall, for simplicity, remain in the case where 1 > 0 and 2 = 0.
Throughout this section, it is assumed that the temporal utility function u(c) takes a simple constant-elasticity form:
where and are preference parameters. 26 As this is well-known, the intercept parameter captures the relative importance, in welfare terms, of the mere survival in comparison with utility from material consumption. 27
The survival function (m) takes the following simple form:
where > 0. Note that this functional form satis…es the assumptions made in the model: 0 (m) > 0; 00 (m) < 0 and (m) 1=2 8m:
We shall use those following benchmark values for key parameters. 28
parameters w values 10 0.83 1 10 Table 1 : Parameter values
In order to illustrate the sensitivity of our theoretical results to the heterogeneity of agents's attitudes towards risk, Table 2 presents the laissez-faire, the …rst-best and second-best allocations under various levels of preference parameter 1 , while 2 = 0.
Regarding the laissez-faire, let us …rst note that, as 1 rises, …rst and second-period consumptions for type-1 agents fall, and health spending m 1 grow. This is in conformity 2 6 That functional form is also used by Becker et al (2005) . Note that can no longer be interpreted here as the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion with respect to c, because individual utility function takes a non-expected utility form under 6 = 0. 2 7 The parameter can be estimated, together with other preference parameters and i , from empirical estimates of the 'neutral'consumption ‡ow (making a person indi¤erent between a period of life with that consumption and death). 2 8 Note that the preference parameter is …xed to a strictly positive level to guarantee the nonnegativity of health expenditures. 20 
with the scenario (i) of Proposition 2 above: as the degree of variance-sensitivity grows, agents reduce their second-period consumption and raise their health e¤ort. Note also that, as expected, we have d 1 < d 2 . In this example, variance-sensitive agents consume less in the …rst period, and spend more on health in comparison with EU maximizers.
At the …rst-best, …rst-period consumptions are equalized across all agents. Note that, as 1 rises, it is socially optimal to raise m 1 and to decrease m 2 . This result was not guaranteed at the general level: as this was discussed in Section 3, two e¤ects are here at work: as 1 grows, the reduction of the variance of lifetime welfare of type-1 agents becomes more important for the social planner, but, given a decreasing d 1 , the direct utility gain from investing in the survival of type-1 agents is lower. In the present case, the high intercept (…xed to 10) makes the …rst e¤ect dominate the second one, so that a rise in the degree of variance sensitivity of type-1 agents leads to a larger health spending for those agents. That high intercept means that it is survival that matters above all, so that type-2 agents tend to copy type-1 agents in order to bene…t from higher health spending at the social optimum. 29 Hence, in order to prevent EU maximizers from pretending to be variance-sensitive, the second-best policy involves a tax on savings of type-1 agents.
Note, however, that the sign of the optimal second-best tax on health spending varies Given the importance of the preference parameter for the issue at stake, it makes sense to explore the sensitivity of our conclusions to its level. That sensitivity analysis is carried out in Table 3 , which shows the laissez-faire, the …rst-best and second-best under varying between 10 and -3. 30 Not surprisingly, the laissez-faire level of health expenditures tends to fall monotonically as falls: when survival per se becomes less important, agents tend to invest less in their health.
In terms of public policy, we can notice that, as falls, there is a fall in optimal health spending, and a rise in …rst-period and second-period consumptions for all agents. As far as the …rst-best is concerned, it should be stressed that, as falls, the gap between m 1 and m 2 falls, as, for a given 1 , the gain, in welfare terms, from spending more in the survival of type-1 agents relative to type-2 agents decreases. 31 Regarding the second-best, it is crucial to notice that, whereas there is a tendency of EU maximizers to copy type-1 agents when is large, the opposite holds when becomes strongly negative. The intuition for this is merely that, under a low , survival does no longer matter per se, so that type-2 agents do no longer want the high health spending of type-1 agents. On the contrary, type-1 agents are tempted to copy type-2 agents to bene…t from their larger second-period consumption, explaining the inverse copying behavior.
As a consequence, while the second-best policy involves the taxation of type-1 agents' savings and the subsidization of type-1's health spending when is large, we observe the opposite for low. For completeness of analysis, Table 4 shows also the laissez-faire, the …rst-best and second-best optima for di¤erent values of the preference parameter . 32 Here again, it appears that the most plausible case is the one where variance-insensitive agents are tempted to copy variance-sensitive agents in order to bene…t from higher health spending. 33 Hence, it does not come as a surprise that the optimal second-best policy involves the taxation of type-1 agents'savings and a subsidy on type-1 health spending, which turns into a tax as falls. 34 3 2
1 is here …xed to 0.1 and equals 10. 3 3 The reason for this is the high intercept = 10. Finally, Table 5 explores the sensitivity of our conclusions to the shape of the survival function (m). For that purpose, we make the parameter vary between 0.5 and 2. As grows, the productivity of health spending grows, implying here a fall of health spending under the laissez-faire for all agents (but the fall is stronger for variance-sensitive agents), as well as a rise in …rst-and second-period consumptions. In the …rst-best, the rise in implies also a rise in …rst-and second-period consumptions, as well as a fall of health spending. In sum, this numerical application con…rms the …ndings of previous sections: the form of the optimal tax and transfer policy depends on the degree of variance-sensitivity of agents, and on the shapes of utility and survival functions. Whereas the case where EU maximizers are tempted to copy variance-sensitive agents to bene…t from higher health spending seems more plausible, whether health expenditures of the mimickee should be taxed or subsidized depends on the precise parametrization of the model.
Conclusions
This paper aims at studying the optimal taxation policy in an economy where agents can in ‡uence their longevity through health e¤orts but who di¤er in their attitude towards lotteries of life. For that purpose, we set up a two-period model in which the agents in ‡uence their survival probability by means of …rst-period health spending. Moreover, the heterogeneity of agents is captured by assuming that preferences on lotteries of life can be represented by various sensitivities to the variance of lifetime utilities.
It is shown that, in the laissez-faire, a higher sensitivity to the dispersion of psychological value implies that an agent spends more on health (at the cost of second-period 25 halshs-00586247, version 1 -15 Apr 2011 consumption), or, on the contrary, spend less on health (to favour …rst-period consumption). The choice between those two ways to protect oneself against a high volatility of lifetime welfare depends on the speci…c functional forms for u(c ) and (m ).
At the social optimum, …rst-period consumptions are equalized across agents, whereas agents with a higher sensitivity to the variance should have a lower second-period consumption. It is not obvious to see whether more variance-sensitive agents should bene…t from higher or lower health expenditures, as, from a social point of view, the welfare gain from reducing the variance of their lifetime welfare is to be compared with the lower expected welfare associated with the survival of those agents (given their lower second-period consumption). The social optimum can be decentralized by means of group-speci…c taxes on health spending (to internalize the Becker-Philipson e¤ect) and by adequate lump sum transfers.
Under asymmetric information, it is not obvious to see which form the secondbest policy should take, as the mimicking may occur from agents with a low-variancesensitivity to agents with a high-variance-sensitivity or the opposite. In the former case, the second-best policy requires a tax on the mimickees'savings and a tax or a subsidy on their health expenditures, as subsidizing health expenditures is a way to guarantee incentive-compatibility in that case. In the opposite case, the second-best policy requires a subsidy on the mimickees' savings, and a tax on their health spending. Whether it is the former or the latter case that prevails depends on the intercept of the temporal utility function. Numerical simulations emphasized also some other determinants of the second-best policy, including parameters of the survival functions.
To conclude, it should be stressed that the present study, by focusing exclusively on one source of heterogeneity across agents (their sensitivity to variance of utilities)
only covers one aspect of the design of the optimal taxation policy under endogenous (di¤erentiated) longevity. Undoubtedly, other sources of heterogeneity exist, regarding, for instance, the genetic background, the degree of rationality/myopia, the impatience or the disutility of e¤orts. Hence, one could hardly hope to provide a complete answer to that problem without considering what the optimal policy becomes when those various 26 halshs-00586247, version 1 -15 Apr 2011 sources of heterogeneity coexist. To answer that question, a crucial point will concern how those di¤erent characteristics are correlated across individuals types. Thus, in the light of the di¢ culties faced in the present study where agents di¤ered in only one aspect, one could hardly overestimate the problems raised by a more complete study of optimal taxation in an economy where agents di¤er in several characteristics in ‡uencing longevity.
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